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Comment
Access to Legal Services
Through Advertising and Specialization
HON. ROBERT H. STATON*
In an American society which has grown in population from a few
million to several hundred million, there is an urgent societal need for ready
access to legal services. Much of this need has been generated by stratified
governmental regulations which affect every conceivable movement of the in-
dividual and his family. These extensive government regulations coupled with
an almost equal number of legislative enactments have completely extinguish-
ed the "simple life" of the past.' In this highly complex, urbanized society, it
has been estimated that seventy percent of the population does not have ade-
quate access to legal services. 2 This group consists principally the middle
class-those persons who cannot qualify for free legal services but find that
there is little reserve in the family budget for legal fees.'
Some minimal efforts have been made to solve this festering societal need
for ready access to affordable legal services. Pre-paid legal services is one ef-
fort which has not yet reached its full potential4 though other efforts have
been made by state bar organizations.5 The American Bar Association has
*Presiding Judge, Indiana Court of Appeals.
'R. POUND. THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 242 (1953).
2See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES: PAPERS
AND DOcUMENTS ASSEMBLED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 2 (1972),
quoted in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
3B. CHRISTENSEN. LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 128-35, 151 (1970). See also
Agreement Launches Pre-paid Legal Services Plan, 21 RES GESTAE 477 (1977).4See Meserve, Our Forgotten Client: The Average American, 57 A.B.A.J. 1092 (1971). In
his discussion of prepaid legal services, Robert W. Meserve, who was then President-elect of the
American Bar Association, noted: "The organized Bar now must move to make the necessary
changes in the way legal services are made available to the client of moderate means because
there are increasing and significant developments [towards this end] outside the organized profes-
sion." Id. at 1094. He further predicted in his article that,
If we do not put forth this concerted effort, fundamental changes in the mode of prac-
ticing law will be determined to our disadvantage and to the disadvantage of our socie-
ty as a whole by forces outside of the profession not restrained by professional, ethical
requirements. Changes are already occurring in response to pressures for more ade-
quate systems of making legal services available. We must participate in planning and
reshaping a better system of providing our services so that the public will be assured of
adequate and professionally sound services.
Id. at 1092.
'For prepaid legal services under the sponsorship of the 'Indiana State Bar Association see
21 RES GESTAE 477 (1977).
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conducted surveys and appointed special committees to make factual findings
and to make policy recommendations; its 1978 Law Day theme is, "The Law:
Your Access to Justice." Inadequate access to legal services for the majority of
the American people leaves little cause for celebration. Without adequate ac-
cess to affordable legal services for the middle class majority, there can only
be justice for the minority of the American society. Each day this problem
becomes more visible, more urgent, and more immediate.
The immediacy of the problem has been magnigied recently by the
United States Supreme Court opinion in Bates v. State Bar of ArizonaG which
permits lawyers to advertise. Justice Blackmum's majority opinion in which
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens concurred, underscored the
public's access to cost information as necessary for an intelligent selection of
legal services. Such cost was the reason given for not consulting a lawyer by
47.6% of the families interviewed in one survey; however, fear of high costs
appears to lack a factual basis. In another survey, the public estimated the
cost of preparing a "simple will" to be ninety-one percent more than the ac-
tual cost.8 In the same survey, the cost estimated by the public for reading
and advising upon the rights and duties of the parties as set forth in a two
page installment sales contract exceeded actual cost by 340%; the cost
estimate for a thirty minute consultation exceeded actual cost by 123%. 9
These surveys were taken before the Bates opinion and without regard to
"routine" legal services.10
Following Bates there were very few lawyers who wanted to advertise the
prices of their routine legal services. On August 5, 1977, The New York
Times reported: "Lawyers around the country have begun slowly and
cautiously testing the uncharted waters of advertising since the Supreme
Court ruled in June that, for the first time in 69 years, they could publicize
their services and probable fees."'" In the Chicago Daily News on the same
day Don Wycliff reported: "Lawyers, generally regarded as a conservative lot,
are living up to that image in reaction here to the Supreme Court's recent
decision allowing them to advertise their prices and services. In fact, in the
Chicago area they're going at it as gingerly as a swimmer dipping his toes in-
to water he suspects may be ice cold.' a2 In the Los Angeles Times where over
seventy block ads appeared, only about ten per cent advertised prices.' 3 Most
of the ads just advised the public as to what kind of services the lawyer
6433 U.S. 350 (1977).
1E. Koos. THE FAMILY & THE LAW 7 (1948), as cited in Bates, 433 U.S. at 370 n.22.
$See PETITION OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE DsTIcT OF COLUMBIA BAR FOR
AMENDMENTS TO RULE X OF THE RULES GOVERNING THE BAR OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
(1976), wherein the study was reported, as cited in Bates 433 U.S. at 370 n.22.9See 433 U.S. at 370 n.22.
10See id. at 368.
"N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1977, at Bi, col. 3.
"Chi. Daily News, Aug. 5, 1977, at 5, cal. 1.
1363 A.B.A.J. 1065, 1065 (1977).
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rendered to the public. Rance Crain, editor-in-chief of Advertising Age, a
national weekly advertising newspaper which reports marketing trends, said,
"There is little need to list prices. . . The big benefit of advertising for
lawyers is just to say that they are in business, that they are available, and
that here are the kinds of work they do. Advertising probably will help the
whole image of the law profession by helping people learn just what it is that
lawyers do."
'14
At the American Bar Association meeting in Chicago held on August 10,
1977, S. Shepard Tate, Chairman of the Task Force on Lawyer Advertising,
submitted proposed guidelines for lawyer advertising. 5 The guidelines finally
adopted by the American Bar Association were to be circulated to the highest
courts of all states and to the state regulatory agencies for their consideration.
These guidelines were only recommended guidelines and were to be amended
by the various states as they deemed necessary. Following the submission of
this proposal the Indiana State Bar Association's Advertising Committee met
and revised the American Bar Association's guidelines so that they would con-
form with Indiana's Code of Professional Responsibility. These revised
guidelines were finally submitted to the House of Delegates of the Indiana
State Bar Association at the 1977 Fall Meeting of the Association with a
report of the Lawyer Advertising Committee of the Indiana State Bar
Association which is attached as Appendix A. Several amendments were
made by the House of Delegates to the guidelines before they were approved.
The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the guidelines recommended by the In-
diana State Bar Association effective January 1, 1978. Its order is reproduced as
appendix B.
Several fundamental concepts should be reviewed when examining the
new advertising guidelines adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court. First, the
"limited practice" concept is one which has been fostered by law list
publishers to assist their subscribers to locate the most qualified lawyer in a
particular geographic area. Although the guidelines submitted to the states
by the American Bar Association carried forward this concept of limited
practice, the Indiana State Bar Association did not recommend its adoption
by the Indiana Supreme Court. There are several reasons for deleting this
concept from the ABA guidelines.
One reason is the increasing number of approved specialization programs
by state supreme courts.16 The term "limited practice," used in these
specialization programs to designate competency, has become a term of art.
41d. at 1067.
,See AMERICAN BAR As sOCIATION. REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOvERNORS TO THE HousE OF
DELEGATES CONCERNING LAWYER ADVERTISING, 46 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 23, 1977).
"The only source which collects information by state is the Specialization Committee of the
American Bar Association in Chicago. A member of the Specialization Committee who is well ac-
quainted with the material and source is Otto F. Schug, Attorney at Law, 1220 Washington
Street, Columbus, Indiana 47201, Telephone 1-812-376-1915. Mr. Schug is also the Chairman of
the Indiana State Bar Association's Committee on Specialization. See also note 23 supra.
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In many of the specialization programs, "limited practice" means that the
lawyer is a specialist in one or more fields of law. The state supreme court
recognizes this special competency of the lawyer by formal certification or by
permitting the lawyer to hold himself out to the public as a specialist. In
either instance, the lawyer is permitted to advertise his specialty to the public.
Recognition by the state supreme court as a specialist has two purposes: (1) to
assist the public in finding a lawyer who would be best qualified to handle
the legal problem; and (2) to avoid any possible deception through lawyer
advertising as to the competency of the lawyer in a particular field of law.
A second reason for not adopting the "limited practice" concept is that
any attempt to incorporate it would obviously create a conflict with any
meaningful specialization program which might be adopted later by the In-
diana Supreme Court. Therefore, a distinction exists between a lawyer who
confines his practice to one or more fields of law and the lawyer who
specializes in one or more fields of law. The amendment to Canon 2, EC
2-14, effective January 1, 1978 stresses the distinction as follows:
EC 2-14 In some instances a lawyer confines his practice to a particular
field of law. In the absence of state controls to insure the existence of special
competence, a lawyer should not be permitted to hold himself out as a
specialist, other than in the fields of admiralty, trademark, and patent law
where a holding out as a specialist historically has been permitted.
17
To make the distinction complete between a "limited practice" as it identifies
a specialist on the one hand and a lawyer who merely confines his practice to
certain fields of law on the other hand, Disciplinary Rule 2-105 was adopted.
It provides:
DR 2-105 Limitation of Practice.
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, or as
limiting his practice, except:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent
and Trademark Office may use the designation 'Patents,'
'Patent Attorney,' 'Patent Lawyer,' or 'Registered Patent
Attorney' or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead
and office sign. A lawyer engaged in the trademark practice
may use the designation 'Trademarks,' 'Trademark Attorney,'
or 'Trademark Lawyer,' or any combination of those terms,
on his letterhead and office sign.
(2) A lawyer engaged in the admiralty practice may use the
designation 'Admiralty,' 'Proctor in Admiralty,' or 'Admiralty
Lawyer,' or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead
and office sign. 18
"See Appendix B.
"See id.
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The concept of "limited practice" which has now become a term of art
should be avoided in lawyer advertising since it transcends the ordinary and
common meaning. In Indiana, the "limited practice" concept should be
avoided until the Indiana Supreme Court adopts a specialization program
which will take into consideration the concept of quality.
The Bates opinion excludes the quality of legal services concept from its
consideration for lawyer advertising. It states:
First, we need not address the peculiar problems associated with advertising
claims relating to the quality of legal services. Such claims probably are not
susceptible to precise measurement or verification and, under some cir-
cumstances, might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or even
false.' 9
What Bates did singularly consider was a very narrow issue: "The heart of the
dispute before us today is whether lawyers also may constitutionally advertise
the prices at which certain routine services will be performed. 2 0 Therefore, a
meaningful specialization program will be needed to fill the hiatus caused by
the exclusion of quality by Bates so that advertising will give the full access of
legal services to the public. Any advertising scheme which does not provide
for the quality concept will constantly be confronted with the problem of
deceptive advertising and overreaching under the code of professional respon-
sibility. Furthermore, the access problem is more pronounced in the area of
where the public can find a competent lawyer to handie a particular legal
problem than in the area of cost.
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility has been amended by
the Indiana Supreme Court to avoid certain references to quality. One exam-
ple is
EC 2-9 which in part provides: Examples of information in law advertising
that would be deceptive includes misstatements of fact, suggestions that the
ingenuity or prior record of a lawyer rather than the justice of the claim are
the principal factors likely to determine the result, inclusion of information
irrelevant to selecting a lawyer, and representations concerning the quality of
service, which cannot be measured or verified.21
The Indiana Judicial Council on Legal Education and Competence at the
Bar has been studying the suitability of a specialization program for Indiana.
At the 1977 Fall Meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association, it joined the
Association's Specialization Committee Chairman in presenting a seminar on
specialization." Five articles published in the Indiana State Bar Association
"9433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977).
20Id. at 367-68.
21See Appendix B.
22See Appendix C.
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Journal, Res Gestae, were used as an introductory text to the specialization
seminar. 23 At the seminar, six panelists explained the certification programs
and the self-designation programs of specialization which have been adopted
in California, Texas, Florida, and New Mexico. 24 Other similar specialization
programs which have been approved by state supreme courts in other states
were also discussed by the panel. 25 An inherent part of any specialization pro-
gram is the advertising of specialized legal services and making those services
more accessible to the public. The Indiana Judicial Council on Legal Educa-
tion and Competence at the Bar26 is conducting a specialization survey of all
Indiana lawyers registered to practice law. This survey will be completed in
January, 1978. After the results of the survey have been determined, The In-
diana Judicial Council will make its recommendations to the Indiana
Supreme Court.
The price information and "limited practice" concepts of lawyer advertis-
ing are only a part of the problem of making legal services more accessible to
the majority of the public.27 In the Bates opinion, it was noted that: "The
absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the profession's failure to reach
out and serve the community: studies reveal that many persons do not obtain
counsel even when they perceive a need because of the feared price of services
or because of an inability to locate a competent attorney."28 The public's
"inability to locate a competent attorney" is not only reflected in the surveys
referred to by the Bates opinion but by the increase in insurance premiums
being paid for malpractice programs in an effort to solve the problem of the
public's inability to find a competent lawyer.29 A specialization program
should have at least three major purposes: (1) to increase the access of the
public to specialized legal services; (2) to promote quality specialized legal
services by establishing minimum standards of competence; and (3) to reduce
the cost of specialized legal services to the middle class or the seventy per cent
23See Staton, Lawyer Specialization-Is It Suitable for Indiana? (pts. 1-5), 21 R s GESTAE
144, 196, 246, 294, 380 (1977).
24See Appendix C.
25Specialization programs have been approved in Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington. See notes 16 and 23 supra.
26See Appendix C.
27In Bates, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Blackmun, noted:
The preliminary release of some of the results of a survey conducted by the ABA
Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs in collaboration with the American Bar
Foundation reveals that 48.7% strongly agreed and another 30.2% slightly agreed with
the statement that people do not go to lawyers because they have no way of knowing
which lawyers are competent to handle their particular problems. 3 Alternatives: Legal
Services & the Public, January 1976, 15. See B. Curran & F. Spalding, The Legal
Needs of the Public 96 (Preliminary Report 1974) (an earlier report concerning the
same survey). Although advertising by itself is not adequate to deal with this problem
completely, it can provide some of the information that a consumer needs to make an
intelligent selection.
433 U.S. at 370-71 n.23 (1977).
28Id. at 370 n.22.
"See note 25 supra & text accompanying.
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referred to in the Bates opinion.s° The American Bar Association's Special
Committee on Specialization reported that:
Specialization permits the lawyer to make the most efficient use of his time,
skills and knowledge. The complexity of our society and the increasing par-
ticipation therein by government . . . [make] it clear that no individual
lawyer can be proficient in the performance of all legal tasks. We believe that
an ever-expanding economy will inevitably lead to an ever-increasing pattern
of specialization by practicing lawyers in a limited number of the various
fields of law practice. It also appears to us that an increase in the number of
lawyers who specialize in and of itself would improve the overall quality of
total services rendered by lawyers to their clients, simply because those
lawyers who specialize will have an opportunity to concentrate their ex-
perience and their continuing legal education. s5
The policy of the American Bar Association has been to let the several
states initiate and develop specialization programs rather than suggesting a
national specialization program.3 2 Disciplinary Rule 2-105(A)(4) provides:
(a) lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law or law
practice by the authority having jurisdiction under state law over the subject
of specialization by lawyers may hold himself out as such specialist but only
in accordance with rules prescribed by that authority.33
The rationale for Disciplinary Rule 2-105(A)(4) is set forth in EC 2-14 which
states that:
In some instances a lawyer confines his practice to a particular field of law.
In the absence of state controls to insure the existence of special competence,
a lawyer should not be permitted to hold himself out as a specialist or as hav-
ing special training or ability, other than in the historically excepted fields of
admiralty, trademark, and patent law.34
Therefore, every state supreme court will have to adopt its own specialization
program and make the necessary adjustments required for lawyer advertising.
"
0See note 2 supra.
s3The ABA Special Committee on Specialization reported to the ABA House of Delegates
at its 1969 mid-Winter meeting that
several states are now actively considering whether or not they should promulgate their
own plans for the certification and regulation of legal specialists. Among those states
are California, Colorado, Florida, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In fact, at
least twenty-five state bar associations have committees studying the matter of
specialization.
ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SPECIALIzATION. COMMITrEE AND SECTION REPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES. Rep. 33, at 9 (1969). It should be noted that a number of those states as well as
others have adopted programs. See note 25 supra & text accompanying.
"
1See id. National specialization plan was deferred by ABA House of Delegates at the 1969
mid-winter meeting.
"
3ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY No. 2.
341d.
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This will be a most formidable task, since specialization is directly related to
advertising. Not only will some form of certification be necessary for the
specialist, but the price of "routine" specialized services may have to be con-
sidered. s5
Most specialization programs considered before Bates limited advertising
to the yellow pages of telephone directories. As a matter of policy, most
telephone companies do not permit the advertising of prices in their direc-
tories. One reason for this policy is obviously the elapse time between the
publication of directories. This elapse time is usually twelve months; any
price given to the telephone company while it is preparing for the publication
and distribution of its directories might likely be obsolete before the next
directory could be published. If a policy were adopted which would provide
for a more frequent publication of telephone directories, the cost of advertis-
ing would undoubtedly be increased and so would the cost of legal services.
An alternative may be the publication of a directory by the organized bar of
each state.
Publication of prices for "routine" legal services may be binding on the
lawyer for different periods of time after publication. The periods of time are
set forth in. Indiana's new DR 2-101(E) which became effective January 1,
1978. It provides:
(E) Unless otherwise specified in the advertisement, if a lawyer publishes
any fee information authorized under DR 2-101(B) in a publication that
is published more frequently than one time per month, the lawyer shall
be bound by any representation made therein for a period of not less
than 30 days after such publication. If a lawyer publishes any fee
information authorized under DR 2-101(B) in a publication that is pub-
lished once a month or less frequently, he shall be bound by any
representation made therein until the publication of the succeeding
issue. If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized under DR
2-101(B) in a publication which has no fixed date for publication of
a succeeding issue, the lawyer shall be bound by any representation
made therein for a reasonable period of time after publication but in
no event less than one year.-6
If a directory is published without any fixed date for a succeeding issue to
be published, the lawyers listing prices for their services would be bound to
"
5In concurring in part and dissenting in part from the majority opinion in Bates, Mr.
Justice Powell observed:
What legal services are "routine" depends on the eye of the beholder. A par-
ticular service may be quite routine to a lawyer who has specialized in that area for
many years. The marital trust provisions of a will, for example, are routine to the ex-
perienced tax and estate lawyer; they may be wholly alien to the negligence litigation
lawyer. And what the unsophisticated client may think is routine simply cannot be
predicted.
433 U.S. 250, 392 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"
6See Appendix B.
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the price advertised for at least a year. In an economy with uncertain infla-
tionary problems, price advertising of legal services could become disasterous.
Price is not the only difficulty with directory advertising. The listing of
legal services in telephone directories by states which have specialization pro-
grams has been plagued by "legalese". Legalese is the language of the legal
profession, and it is seldom understood by the lay public. This is especially
true of the members of the lay public who have never had an occasion to seek
a lawyer's advice. Even one visit to a lawyer's office does not increase the
understanding of legalese for the lay public sufficiently to understand such
directory designations as "Consumer Law", "Domestic Relations", and
"Wrongful Death." An American Bar Association survey revealed that 35.8%
of the adult population has never visited a lawyer for legal services and that
another 27.9% of the adult population has visited a lawyer only once for
legal services.3 7 Any published directory which is intended to make legal ser-
vices more accessible to those members of the public who have no or very lit-
tle experience with the legal profession, should designate the legal services be-
ing made available in the language of the lay public. An ideal approach
would be to make a preliminary language study so that the legal service could
be identified with the most frequently understood designation. Of course,
there are some common sense designations which could be used: "Divorce";
"Custody of Child"; "Changing Divorce Decree"; "Support in Arrears"; "Adop-
tions"; "Wills"; "Estate Planning"; "Estate Administration"; "Estate, Claims
Against"; "Estate Taxes-Return Preparation"; "Corporate Taxes"; "Taxes-
Personal Returns"; "Workmen's Compensation Claims"; "Accidents", with
subheadings such as "Automobile", "Goods Purchased", "Pedestrian"; and
many others which relate to the understanding of the lay public. Admittedly,
changes of designations for certain legal services would have to be made
where experience dictated that a change is necessary.
The District of Columbia Bar has published a directory which attempts to
make legal services more accessible to the lay public.38 Most of the prices
quoted in the directory relate to initial consultations and hourly rates charged
for "out of court" and "in court" legal services. Even some of the dissenters in
Bates agreed that these advertised prices would not be misleading. Justice
Powell in his opinion which concurred in part and dissented in part from the
majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun, stated:
The Court observes, and I agree, that there is nothing inherently misleading
in the advertisement of the cost of an initial consultation. Indeed, I would
not limit the fee information to the initial conference. Although the skill and
experience of lawyers vary so widely as to negate any equivalence between
17See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SURVEY LEGAL NEEDS. 3 ALTERNATIVEs: LEGAL SERVICE
& THE PUBLIC 15 (1976).
3 The District of Columbia Bar, 1426 H Street, N.W. Suite 840, Washington, D.C. 20005.
The directory is entitled "Lawyer Directory" 1977-78.
1977-19781
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hours of service by different lawyers, variations in quality of service by duly
licensed lawyers are inevitable. Lawyers operate, at least for the purpose of
internal control and accounting, on the basis of specified hourly rates, and
upon request-or in an appropriate case-most lawyers are willing to under-
take employment at such rate. The advertisement of this rate in an ap-
propriate medium, duly designated, would not necessarily be misleading if
this fee information also made clear that the total charge for the representa-
tion would depend on the number of hours devoted to the client's pro-
blem- a variable difficult to predict. Where the price content of the adver-
tisement is limited to the finite item of rate per hour devoted to the client's
problem, the likelihood of deceiving or misleading is considerably less than
when specific services are advertised at a fixed price.3 9
In the front of the District of Columbia Bar Directory, there is a
disclaimer as to the accuracy of the information concerning ". . . lawyer's
fees, areas of practice, or experience. . .", and it further warns the public to
"Be certain to discuss 1977 fee schedules with your lawyer in the event that
they may differ from the published information." 40 Under "Areas of Legal
Practice" this designation of legal services is used "ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND AGENCY PRACTICE (including Aviation and Air Transportation
Law, Communications Law, Consumer Product Safety, Energy and En-
vironmental Law, and Freedom of Information Act)". Several of the listings
under this heading are as follows:
BEAR, ROBERT HARLEY Born: 05/26/50 2600 Virginia Avenue,
N.W., #300, Washington, DC 20037 333-4500 Bar admissions: DC-75;
US Ct. of Cla
Type of practice: General practice with emphasis on civil and criminal litiga-
tion before courts and federal agencies.
Fee for initial office consultation: None
Other fee information: I charge $20 per hour for work performed out of
court and $30 per hour for court appearances and other hearing ap-
pearances. Upon request, I will quote in most cases a flat fee.
Education: Catholic University Law School (1972-1975); won Miller Cup
Competition in appellate advocacy; Law Review; American Jurisprudence
Awards in Criminal Law, Constitutional Law. Rutgers College (1968-1972).
Experience: Former law clerk to the Trial Division of the United States Court
of Claims (1975-1976). Summer Associate, Mudge Rose Guthrie and Alex-
ander, New York, N.Y. 1974).
BEITER, NANCY RANDALL Born: 12/13/46
Law Offices of George T. Qualley (2 Attys.)
Suite 320, 1819 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006
223-8797 Bar admissions: DC-74
Type of practice: General Practice
Fee for initial office consultation: None
Other fee information: $30 per hour for most types of work, $50 per hour
for specialized work practicing before the Interstate Commerce Commission.
39433 U.S. 350. 399-400 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40See note 38 supra at iv; note 36 supra & text accompanying.
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Some flat fees for domestic relations or criminal cases. $150 per day in court
or before Admin agency.
Languages: Spanish
Education: B.A. Manhattanville College, Purchase, New York, J.D. George
Washington University, Washington, D.C.
4
1
The District of Columbia Lawyer Directory includes the following explana-
tion:
This Directory of lawyers and legal service organizations has been com-
piled by the District of Columbia Bar as an experimental effort to help peo-
ple find lawyers.
This Directory lists lawyers in eighteen generally recognized areas of legal
practice. Each lawyer chose the area or areas of practice where he or she is
listed and provided the information about himself or herself. Lawyers within
each particular area of legal practice are listed alphabetically. Information
about the listed lawyers-such as length and kind of legal experience, fee in-
formation, educational background, and other professional information-is
included so that a person seeking legal assistance will be able to make com-
parisons.
The District of Columbia Bar does not guarantee the accuracy or com-
pleteness of the information listed. Each lawyer is personally responsible for
the information that he or she has given. No group of lawyers at this time is
formally recognized as 'specialists' in the District of Columbia, except for pa-
tent and trademark lawyers.
In addition there is a list of legal services organizations which furnish fee
or reduced cost legal services to persons who cannot afford the full cost of
legal services. Finally, there is a list of other service organizations which do
not provide legal services but do help people with problems. 42
It has been suggested that a separate directory be prepared for the
specialist.4 3 The services of a specialist are used by the more sophisticated lay
public. These members of the public have used the services of a lawyer many
times and are familiar with the legalese used by the legal profession. They are
usually acquainted with the specialized legal service need to help them solve
their problem. What they lack is the information to find the lawyer who can
render the specialized legal service. General business corporations, banks, sav-
ings and loan companies, public utilities, land developers, and real estate
brokers are among those members of the lay public who know the kind of
specialized legal service needed. They might need a specialist on zoning,
estate planning, corporate taxation, or even legislative drafting for a propos-
ed piece of legislation. Perhaps a lawyer engaged in the general practice
41See note 38 supra at 3.
42See id. at 1.
4'D. Brink, Identification of Specialist Categories (May 1977) (unpublished paper presented
to the ABA Specialization Committee in May, 1977 at Washington, D.C.). See also Brink, Let's
Take Specialization Apart, 62 A.B.A.J. 191 (1976).
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might need to consult a specialist regarding a problem in a field of law in
which he has limited knowledge. This would permit the general practitioner
to render more competent legal service. Additionally, the time spent resear-
ching unfamiliar legal problems could be used to serve other clients and
hopefully reduce the cost to the client.
The public's lack of access to legal services is primarily a problem which
should be solved by the legal profession. Advertising in the newspapers and
other media may be too expensive. It may increase rather than decrease the
cost of legal services. Each lawyer has a limited number of hours each day
that he can sell to the public. Directory advertising has many advantages.
Cost is comparatively small since there is only one publication a year, and the
directory can be placed directly in the hands of those members of the public
who need legal services in contrast to the "shotgun" approach used in
newspaper advertising. A single newspaper advertisement which informs the
public that the directory is available upon request would be much more
economical. Who will prepare the directory? The state bar association might
be willing to take on the task. It would not only be serving its members but
the public as well. If numerous directory publishers surface to perform the
task, the information will not only be incomplete but confusing to the public.
In the light of the societal interest to be served, advertising can be either
an "age of enlightenment" or a disaster for the legal profession. The Bates
opinion does not define "routine" legal services. It merely states that "The on-
ly services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine ones: the un-
contested divorce, the simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy,
the change of name, and the like-. .".44 If truly "routine" legal services do
not exist, a conceptual compromise may be required to accomplish a more
meaningful purpose-the avoidance of deceptive advertising. Certainly, the
use of disclaimers should be used to avoid any overreaching on the quality of
legal service. Furthermore, a constant vigilance should be maintained by the
organized bar for necessary changes in advertising guidelines so that the
public interest is served by making legal services more accessible. 45
44433 U.S. 350, 372 (1977).
45
Unfortunately, the legal profession in the past has approached solutions for the
protection of the public with too much caution, and, as a result, too little progress has
been made. However, as JUSTICE POWELL points out, infra, at 2716, the organized
bar has recently made some reforms in this sensitive area and more appear to have
been in the offing. Rather than allowing these efforts to bear fruit, the Court today
opts for a draconian "solution" which I believe will only breed more problems than it
can conceivably resolve.
433 U.S. 350, 388 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 53:247
1977-1978] ADVERTISING AND SPECIALIZATION
APPENDIX A
REPORT OF THE
LAWYER ADVERTISING COMMITTEE
OF THE
INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
Indianapolis, Indiana
October 13, 1977
(Nothing contained herein shall be construed as the action of the Indiana State Bar
Association. Any opinions or recommendations herein expressed or made are those of
the Committee submitting this report and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Association until such time as the Association has duly adopted them as Association
policy.)
The Lawyer Advertising Committee was created by the Board of Managers to study
and monitor various developments regarding proposed ethics and disciplinary rule
changes arising nationally and in the states, and challenges to traditional rules by ac-
tionm in the courts.
The framework of its current studies has been (1) the decision of the United States
Supreme Court of June 27, 1977, in Bates & O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona, and (2)
revisions in Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted August 10,
1977, by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association.
The committee's review of the Bates decision brought the conclusion that the current
Canon 2 of the Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court, in effect, was inoperative in
many of its substantive parts. Also it was concluded that it was an obligation of the In-
diana Bar to work promptly toward giving advisory counsel to the Indiana Supreme
Court to the end that Indiana lawyers would have guidance regarding the restrained
advertising permitted.
Meanwhile, the Chief Justice of Indiana, Richard M. Givan, said in a public statement
that the Bates decision will require the Indiana Supreme Court to revise its current
Rules, and that the Court anticipates guidelines would be formulated and incor-
porated in its Rules by January, 1978.
Coincidental with a meeting of the Lawyer Advertising Committee on July 6, a
maiogram message of the American Bar Association was received which requested
that state authorities delay taking actions until proposals of an ABA Task Force on
Lawyer Advertising could be considered by that organization's House of Delegates. The
committee concurred in that request.
Proposed modifications in Canon 2 were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on
August 10. The text of that proposal immediately was supplied members of the In-
diana committee. The committee met on August 18 for a section-by-section discussion
of the proposal and recommendations to be made. The result is the exhibit attached to
this report.
Legal Implications of Bates & O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona:
While the Bates decision does not answer all questions, the following principles concer-
ning lawyer advertising were set forth:
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1. Advertising regulations adopted by state authorities are deemed to be a legitimate
means of preserving professional integrity, and are exempt from the Sherman Act.
2. The traditional ban against lawyer advertising is contrary to the First Amendment.
The five-member majority noted with "particular interest" the dissenting view in
the terms of "the right of the public as consumers and citizens to know about
the activities of the legal profession."
3. Appropriate regulations may be established to restrain false, deceptive or mislead-
ing advertising and to some extent control the time, place and manner of
advertising.
4. A lawyer may advertise certain factual and fee information in print media, in-
cluding the prices at which certain "routine" services will be performed.
5. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech
thereby limiting the holding of the Bates decision to the particular facts of the
case.
6. Although the facts of the case dealt with newspaper advertising, Mr. Justice
Powell notes in footnote 12 in his dissenting opinion, "[I]t is clear that today's
decision cannot be confined on a principled basis to price advertisements in
newspapers. No distinction can be drawn between newspapers and a rather broad
spectrum of other means, for example, magazines, signs in buses and subways,
posters, handbills and mail circulations. But questions remain open as to time,
place, and manner restrictions affecting other media, such as radio and
television." Similarly, the majority opinion at footnote 26 refers to the fact that
certain information is already permitted in legal directories and telephone books,
and states, "If the informaton is not misleading when published in a telephone
directory, it is difficult to see why it becomes misleading when published in a
newspaper."
Proposed Canon 2 Modifications:
The proposal may be described as "regulatory," rather than "directive." It would
specifically authorize certain prescribed forms of lawyer advertising once it is adopted
by the state authority. It would seek in advance to channel commercial an-
nouncements, but would rely on "after-the-fact" enforcement to discipline persons
violating the regulation.
It is a constructive response to the goal recognized by the Supreme Court of providing
consumers with needed information about lawyer services and their costs.
It retains many of the present disciplinary rules that specify the categories of informa-
tion that can be published: name, field or fields of law practice, education, client
reference, etc. It adds certain fee information: contingency fees, a range of fees for
services, hourly rate, and fixed fees for "special legal services the description of which
would not be misunderstood or deceptive." In all, 25 categories of information are
given. [See DR 2-101(B).]
The proposal would not allow one-to-one solicitation, nor would it now permit the use
of television, although permitting the use of radio with the messages prerecorded and
approved for broadcast by the lawyer. [In the ABA discussions regarding radio, it was
noted a large segment of the population is only marginally literate and does not nor-
mally read print media, but is exposed to electronic media regularly.]
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It permits statements as to one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm
practices, "using commonly accepted and understood designations and definitions."
However, it does not permit statements that the practice is "limited" to one or more
fields of law, nor statements that a lawyer or law firm "specializes" in a particular field
of law practice. It recognizes the historical tradition of designations for patent and ad-
miralty lawyers.
Monitoring Developments and Improving the Guidelines:
In ruling that the Constitution permits lawyers to advertise within restrained limita-
tions, the Supreme Court recognized that the Bar has an important role to play:
"In sum, we recognize that many of the problems in defining the boundary
between deceptive and non-deceptive advertising remain to be resolved, and
we expect that the bar will have a special role to play in assuring that adver-
tising by attorneys flows both freely and cleanly." [See slip Opinion at page
32.]
Because of the novelty of lawyer advertising and the limitations of the present
disciplinary system, it is recommended that the Lawyer Advertising Committee of the
Indiana State Bar Association be continued. The Committees should have the duty of
monitoring developments at the local and state bar level, and evaluating the various
systems adopted by other states toward the end that improved guidelines may be con-
sidered and recommended.
It is noted that administrative enforcement of Indiana's current Code of Professional
Responsibility is lodged with the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of In-
diana, and it is assumed that this designated authority will continue.
RECOMMENDA TIONS:
The Lawyer Advertising Committee makes the following recommendations to the
House of Delegates of the Indiana State Bar Association:
1. That the House of Delegates of the Indiana State Bar Association recommend to
the Indiana Supreme Court the amendment of Canon 2 of the Indiana Code of
Professional Responsibility to conform with the exhibit attached.
2. That the Lawyer Advertising Committee continue to be maintained, or be re-
organized as the Board of Managers may determine as appropriate, to monitor
developments at the local and state bar level, to evaluate the various systems
adopted by other states, and to make recommendations with respect to improving
guidelines on lawyer advertising.
Respectfully submitted,
Is! Rabb Emison
Rabb Emison, Chairman
Agnes P. Barrett
John L. Carroll
Gordon S. Eslick
Michael H. Kast
James L. Lowry
Frederick E. Rakestraw
Otto F. Schug
David 0. Tittle
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APPENDIX B
ORDER AMENDING RULES
Pursuant to the inherent rule-making power and authority vested in this Court
[Supreme Court of Indiana] and pursuant to this Court's constitutional responsibility
in the discipline and disbarment of those admitted to practice law, the provisions of
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specified in this order are amended
to read as follows:
RECOGNITION OF LEGAL PROBLEMS
EC 2-2 The legal profession should assist laypersons to recognize legal pro-
blems because such problems may not be self-revealing and often are not
timely noticed. Therefore, lawyers should encourage and participate in
educational and public relations programs concerning our legal system with
particular reference to legal problems that frequently arise. Preparation of
advertisements and professional articles for lay publications and participation
in seminars, lectures, and civic programs should be motivated by a desire to
educate the public to an awareness of legal needs and to provide information
relevant to the selection of the most appropriate counsel rather than to ob-
tain publicity for particular lawyers. The problems of advertising on televi-
sion require special consideration, due to the style, cost, and transitory
nature of, such media. If the interests of laypersons in receiving relevant
lawyer advertising are not adequately served by print media and radio adver-
tising, and if adequate safeguards to protect the public can reasonably be
formulated, television advertising may serve a public interest.
EC 2-3 Whether a lawyer acts properly in volunteering in-person advice to a
layperson to seek legal services depends upon the circumstances. The giving
of advice that one should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the
duty of the legal profession to assist laypersons in recognizing legal problems.
The advice is proper only if motivated by a desire to protect one who does
not recognize that he may have legal problems or who is ignorant of his legal
rights or obligations. It is improper if motivated by a desire to obtain per-
sonal benefit, secure personal publicity, or cause legal action to be taken
merely to harass or injure another. A lawyer should not initiate an in-person
contact with a non-client, personally or through a representative, for the pur-
pose of being retained to represent him for compensation.
EC 2-4 Since motiviation is subjective and often difficult to judge, the
motives of a lawyer who volunteers in-person advice likely to produce legal
controversy may well be suspect if he receives professional employment or
other benefits as a result. A lawyer who volunteers in-person advice that one
should obtain the services of a lawyer generally should not himself accept
employment, compensation, or other benefit in connection with that matter.
However, it is not important for a lawyer to volunteer such advice and render
resulting legal services to close friends, relatives, former clients (in regard to
matters germane to former employment), and regular clients.
EC 2-5 A lawyer who writes or speaks for the purpose of educating members
of the public to rec~gnize their legal problems should carefully refrain from
giving or appearing to give a general solution applicable to all apparently
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similar individual problems, since slight changes in fact situations may re-
quire a material variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public may
be misled and misadvised., Talks and writings by lawyers for laypersons
should caution them not to attempt to solve individual problems upon the
basis of the information contained therein.
EC 2-7 Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted the effec-
tiveness of the traditional selection process. Often the reputations of lawyers
are not sufficiently known to enable laypersons to make intelligent choices.
The law has become increasingly complex and specialized. Few lawyers are
willing and competent to deal with every kind of legal matter, and many
laypersons have difficulty in determining the competence of lawyers to render
different types of legal services. The selection of legal counsel is particularly
difficult for transients, persons moving into new areas, persons of limited
education or means, and others who have little or no contact with lawyers.
Lack of information about the availability of lawyers, the qualifications of
particular lawyers, and the expense of legal representation leads laypersons to
avoid seeking legal advice.
EC 2-8 Selection of a lawyer by a layperson should be made on an informed
basis. Advice and recommendations of third parties-relatives, friends, ac-
quaintances, business associates, or other lawyers-and disclosure of relevant
information about the lawyer and his practice may be helpful. A layperson is
best served if the recommendation is disinterested and informed. In order
that the recommendation be disinterested, a lawyer should not seek to in-
fluence another to recommend his employment. A lawyer should not com-
pensate another person for recommending him, for influencing a prospective
client to employ him, or to encourage future recommendations. Adver-
tisements and public communications, whether in law lists, telephone direc-
tories, newspapers, other forms of print media or radio, should be formulated
to convey only information that is necessary to make an appropriate selection.
Such information includes: (1) office information, such as name, including
name of law firm and names of professional associates; addresses; telephone
numbers; credit card acceptability; fluency in foreign languages; and office
hours; (2) relevant biographical information; (3) description of the practice,
but only by using commonly accepted and understood designations and
definitions, for example, one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law
firm practices; and (4) permitted fee information. Self-laudation should be
avoided.
EC 2-8(A) The proper motivation for commercial publicity by lawyers lies in
the need to inform the public of the availability of competent, independent,
legal counsel. The public benefit derived from advertising depends upon the
usefulness of the information provided the community or to the segment of
the community to which it is directed. Advertising marked by excesses of con-
tent, volume, scope, or frequency which unduly emphasizes unrepresented
biographical information does not provide that public benefit. For example,
prominence should not be given to a prior governmental position outside the
context of the biographical information. Similarly, the use of media whose
scope or nature clearly suggests that the use is intended for self-laudation of
the lawyer without benefit to the public such as the use of billboards, elec-
trical signs, sound trucks, or television commercials distorts the legitimate
purpose of informing the public and is clearly improper. Indeed this and
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other improper advertising may hinder an independent competent counsel,
and advertising that involves excessive cost may unnecessarily increase the
cost for fees for legal service.
EC 2-8(B) Advertisements and other communications should make it ap-
parent that the necessity and advisability of legal action depends on various
factors and must be evaluated individually. Because fee information fre-
quently may be incomplete and misleading to a layperson, a lawyer should
exercise great care to assure that fee information is complete and accurate.
Because of the individuality of each legal problem, public statements regar-
ding average, minimum, or estimated fees may be deceiving as will commer-
cial publicity conveying information as to results previously achieved, general
or average solutions, or expected outcomes. It would be misleading to adver-
tise a set fee for a specific type of case without adhering to the stated fee in
charging clients. Advertisements or public claims that convey an impression
of the ingenuity of the lawyer rather than the justice of the claim is deter-
minative and similarly improper. Statistical data or other information based
on past performance or on prediction of future success is deceptive because it
ignores important parables. Only factual assertations and not opinions should
be made in public communications.
It is improper to claim or imply an ability to influence a Court, tribunal, or
other public body or official except by competent advocacy. Commercial
publicity and public communications addressed to undertaking any legal ac-
tion should always indicate the provisions of such undertaking and should
disclose the impossibility of assuring any particular result. Not only must
commercial publicity be truthful, but its accurate meaning must be apparent
to the layperson with no legal background. Any commercial publicity or
advertising for which payment is made should so indicate unless it is ap-
parent from the context that it is paid publicity or an advertisement.
SELECTION OF A LAWYER: LAWYER ADVERTISING
EC 2-9 The lack of sophistication on the part of many members of the public
concerning legal services, the importance of the interests affected by the
choice of a lawyer and prior experience with unrestricted lawyer advertising,
require that special care be taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the public
and to assure that the information set forth in any advertising is relevant to
the selection of a lawyer. The lawyer must be mindful that the benefits of
lawyer advertising depend upon its reliability and accuracy. Examples of in-
formation in law advertising that would be deceptive include misstatements
of fact, suggestions that the ingenuity or prior record of a lawyer rather than
the justice of the claim are the principal factors likely to determine the result,
inclusion of information irrelevant to selecting a lawyer, and representations
concerning the quality of service, which cannot be measured or verified.
Since lawyer advertising is calculated and not spontaneous, reasonable regula-
tion of lawyer advertising designed to foster compliance with appropriate
standards serves the public interest without impeding the flow of useful,
meaningful, and relevant information to the public.
EC 2-9(A) The traditional regulation of advertising by lawyers is rooted in
the public interest. Competitive advertising through which a lawyer seeks
business by use of extravagant or brash statements or appeals to fears or emo-
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tions could mislead and harm the layperson. Furthermore, public com-
munication that would produce unrealistic techniques in particular cases and
bring about distrust of the law and the lawyers would be harmful to society.
Thus, public confidence in our legal system would be impaired by such
advertisements on professional services. The attorney-client relationship being
personal and unique, should not be established as a result of pressures or
deceptions. However, the desirability of affording the public access to infor-
mation relevant to legal rights have resulted in some relaxation of the former
restrictions against advertising by lawyers. Those restrictions have long been
relaxed in regard to announcement cards, institutional advertising, and in
certain other respects. Historically those restrictions were imposed to prevent
deceptive publicity misleading laypersons, cause distrust in lawyers, and
undermine public confidence in the legal system, and all lawyers should re-
main vigilant to prevent such results. Only unambiguous information relevant
to a layperson's decision regarding his legal rights or his selection of counsel
provided in ways that comport with the dignity of the profession and do not
demean the administration of justice is appropriate in public communica-
tions.
EC 2-10 A lawyer should ensure that the information contained in any adver-
tising which the lawyer publishes, broadcasts or causes to be published or
broadcasted is relevant, is disseminated in an objective and understandable
fashion, and would facilitate the prospective client's ability to compare the
qualifications of the lawyers available to represent him. A lawyer should
strive to communicate such information without undue emphasis upon style
and advertising strategems which serve to hinder rather than to facilitate in-
telligent selection of counsel.
EC 2-10(A) The Disciplinary Rules recognize the value of giving assistance in
the selection process through forms of advertising that furnish identification
of a lawyer while avoiding falsity, deception, and misrepresentation. All
publicity should be evaluated with regard to its effect on the layperson with
no legal experience. The non-lawyer is best served if advertisements contain
no misleading information or emotional appeals and emphasize the necessity
of an individualized evaluation of the situation before conclusions as to legal
needs and probable expenses can be made.
The attorney-client relationship should result from a free and informed
choice by the layperson. Unwarranted promises of benefits, over persuasion,
or vexatious or harassing conduct are improper.
EC 2-11 The name under which a lawyer conducts his practice may be a fac-
tor in the selection process. The use of a trade name or an assumed name
could mislead laypersons concerning the identity, responsibility, and status of
those practicing thereunder. Accordingly, a lawyer in private practice should
practice only under a designation containing his own name, the name of a
lawyer employing him, the name of one or more of the lawyers practicing in
a partnership, or, if permitted by law, the name of a professional legal cor-
poration, which should be clearly designated as such. For many years some
law firms have used a firm name retaining one or more names of deceased or
retired partners and such practices is not improper if the firm is a bona fide
successor of a firm in which the deceased or retired person was a member, if
the use of the name is authorized by law or by contract, and if the public is
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not misled thereby. However, the name of a partner who withdraws from a
firm but continues to practice law should be omitted from the firm name in
order to avoid misleading the public.
EC 2-14 In some instances a lawyer confines his practice to a particular field
of law. In the absence of state controls to insure the existence of special com-
petence, a lawyer should not be permitted to hold himself out as a specialist,
other than in the fields of admirality, trademark, and patent law where a
holding out as a specialist historically has been permitted.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 2-101 Publicity.
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use, or
participate in the use of, any form of public communication
containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to faciliate the process of informed selection of a
lawyer by potential consumers of legal services, a lawyer may
publish without photograph or other pictoral matter, or
broadcast without background music or other sound effects,
subject to DR 2-103, the following information in print media
.distributed or over radio broadcasted in the geographic area
or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in
which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides,
provided that the information disclosed by the lawyer in such
publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is
presented in a dignified manner:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of
professional associates; addresses and telephone
numbers;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law
firm practices, using commonly accepted and under-
stood definitions and designations, or to the extent
authorized under DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and
federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and
other scholastic distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
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(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching position;
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in
bar associations;
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal
societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional
associations and societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the
lawyer participates;
(17) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are
accepted;
(18) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(19) Fee for an initial consultation;
(20) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees
and/or an estimate of the fee to be charged for specific
services;
(21) Contigent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C), provided
that the statement discloses whether percentages are
computed before or after deduction of costs;
(22) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement
discloses that the specific fee within the range which will
be charged will vary depending upon the particular
matter to be handled for each client and the client is
entitled without obligation an estimate of the fee within
the range likely to be charged, in print size equivalent
to the largest print used in setting forth the fee
information;
(23) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that
the total fee charged will depend upon the number of
hours which must be devoted to the particular matter to
be handled for each client and the client is entitled
without obligation to an estimate of the fee likely to be
charged, in print size at least equivalent to the largest
print used in setting forth the fee information;.
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(24) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of
which would not be misunderstood or be deceptive,
provided that the statement discloses that the quoted fee
will be available only to clients whose matters fall into
the services described and that the client is entitled
without obligation to a specific estimate of the fee likely
to be charged in print size at least equivalent to the
largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(C) If the advertisement is communicated to the public over radio,
it shall be prerecorded, approved for broadcast by the lawyer,
and a recording of the actual transmission shall be retained
by the lawyer.
(D) If a lawyer advertises a fee for a service, the lawyer must
render that service for no more than the fee advertised.
(E) Unless otherwise specified in the advertisement, if a lawyer
publishes any fee information authorized under DR 2-101(B)
in a publication that is published more frequently than one
time per month, the lawyer shall be bound by any represent-
ation made therein for a period of not less than 30 days after
such publication. If a lawyer publishes any fee information
authorized under DR 2-101(B) in a publication that is pub-
lished once a month or less frequently, he shall be bound by
any representation made therein until the publication of the
succeeding issue. If a lawyer publishes any fee information
authorized under DR 2-101(B) in a publication which has no
fixed date for publication of a succeeding issue, the lawyer
shall be bound by an representation made therein for a
reasonable period of time after publication but in no event
less than one year.
(F) Unless otherwise specified, if a lawyer broadcasts any fee in-
formation authorized under DR 2-101(B), the lawyer shall be
bound by any representation made therein for a period of not
less than 90 days after such broadcast.
(G) This rule does not prohibit limited and dignified identification
of a lawyer as a lawyer as well as by name:
(1) In political advertisements when his professional status is
germane to the political campaign or to a political issue.
(2) In public notices when the name and profession of a
lawyer are required or authorized by law or are reason-
ably pertinent for a purpose other than the attraction
of potential clients.
(3) In routine reports and announcements of a bona fide
business, civic, professional, or political organization in
which he serves as a director or officer.
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(4) In and on legal documents prepared by him.
(5) In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and other legal
publications, and in dignified advertisements thereof.
(H) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to
representatives of the press, radio, television, or other
communication medium in anticipation of or in return for
professional publicity in a news item.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads and Offices.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not use or participate in the use of
professional cards, professional announcement cards, office
signs, letterheads, or similar professional notices or devices,
except that the following may be used if they are in dignified
form:
(1) A professional card of a lawyer identifying him by name
and as a lawyer, and giving his addresses, telephone
numbers, the name of his law firm, and any information
permitted under DR 2-105. A professional card of a law
firm may also give the names of members and associates.
Such cards may be used for identification.
(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or
changed associations or addresses, change of firm name,
or similar matters pertaining to the professional offices of
a lawyer or law firm, which may be mailed to lawyers,
clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives. It
shall not state biographical data except to the extent
reasonably necessary to identify the lawyer or to explain
the change in his association, but it may state the
immediate past position of the lawyer. It may give the
names and dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line
of succession. It shall not state the nature of the practice
except as permitted under DR 2-105.
(3) A sign on or near the door of the office and in the
building directory identifying the law office. The sign
shall not state the nature of the practice, except as
permitted under DR 2-105.
(4) A letterhead of a lawyer identifying him by name and as
a lawyer, and giving his addresses, telephone numbers,
the name of his law firm, associates and any information
permitted under DR 2-105. A letterhead of a law firm
may also give the names of members and associates; and
names and dates relating to deceased and retired
members. A lawyer may be designated "Of Counsel" on a
letterhead if he has a continuing relationship with a
lawyer, or law firm, other than as a partner or associate.
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A lawyer or law firm may be designated as "General
Counsel" or by similar professional reference on stationery
of a client if he or the firm devotes a substantial amount
of professional time in the representaton of that client.
The letterhead of a law firm may give the names and
dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of
succession.
(B) A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade
name, a name that is misleading as to the identity of the
lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name, or a firm name
containing names other than those of one or more of the
lawyers in the firm, except that the name of a professional
corporation or professional association may contain "P.C." or
"P.A." or similar symbols indicating the nature of the
organization, and if otherwise lawful a firm may use as, or
continue to include in, its name the name or names of one or
more deceased or retired members of the firm or of a prede-
cessor firm in continuing line of succession. A lawyer who
assumes a judicial, legislative, or public executive or admini-
strative post or office shall not permit his name to remain in
the name of a law firm or to be used in professional notices of
the firm during any significant period in which he is not ac-
tively and regularly practicing law as a member of the firm,
and during such period other members of the firm shall not
use his name in the firm name or in professional notices of the
firm.
(C) A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnerhsip
with one or more other lawyers unless they are in fact part-
ners.
(D) A partnership shall not be formed or continued between or
among lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions unless all
enumerations of members and associates of the firm on its let-
terhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdic-
tional limitations on those members and associates of the firm
not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions; however, the
same firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.
(E) A lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and
another profession or business shall not so indicate on his let-
terhead, office sign, or professional card, nor shall he identify
himself as a lawyer in any publication in connection with his
other profession or business.
(F) Nothing contained herein shall prohibit a lawyer from using or
permitting the use of, in connection with his name, an earned
degree or title derived therefrom indicating his training in the
law.
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DR 2-103 Recommendation of Professional Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-101(B),
recommend employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his
partner, or associate to a layperson who has not sought his advice
regarding employment of a lawyer.
(B) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a
person or organization to recommend or secure his employment
by a client or as a reward for having made a recommendation
resulting in his employment by a client, except that he may pay
the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by any of the
organizations listed in DR 2-103 (D).
(C) A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recom-
mend or promotethe use of his services or those of his partner or
associate, or any orhwe lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as
a private practitioner, except as authorized in DR 2-101, and ex-
cept that:
(1) He may request referrals from a lawyer referral service
operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association
and may pay its fees incident thereto.
(2) He may cooperate with the legal service activities of any
of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR
2-103(D)(1) through (4) and may perform legal services
for those to whom he was recommended by it to do such
work if:
(a) The person to whom the recommendation is made is
a member or beneficiary of such office or organiza-
tion; and
(b) The lawyer remains free to exercise his independent
professional judgment on behalf of his client.
(D) A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer af-
filiated withhim or his firm may be recommended, employed by
or paid by, or may cooperate with, one of the following offices or
organizations that promote the use of his services or those of his
partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm if there is no interference with the exercise of independent
professional judgment in behalf of his client:
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide non-profit
community organization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
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(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar assoication.
(2) A military legal assistance office.
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a
bar association.
(4) Any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays
for legal services to its members or beneficiaries provided the
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized
and operated that no profit is derived by it from the ren-
dition of legal services by lawyers, and that, if that organ-
ization is organized for profit, the services are not rend-
ered by lawyers employed, directed, supervised or selected
by it except in connection with matters where such organ-
ization bears ultimate liability of its member of bene-
ficiary.
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, nor any
non-lawyer, shall have initiated or promoted such
organization for the primary purpose of providing
financial or other benefit to such lawyer, partner,
associate or affiliated lawyer.
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of pro-
curing legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a
private practitioner outside of the legal services program
of the organization.
(d) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are
furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as the
client of the lawyer in the matter.
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal
services furnished or paid for by the organization may, if
such member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel
other than that furnished, selected or approved by the
organization for the particular matter involved; and the
legal service plan of such organization provides appro-
priate relief for any member or beneficiary who asserts a
claim that representation by counsel furnished, selected
or approved would be unethical, improper or inadequate
under the circumstances of the matter involved and the
plan provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such
relief.
(f) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that
such organization is in violation of applicable laws, rules
of court and other legal requirements that govern its legal
service operations.
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(g) Such organization has filed with the Disciplinary Commi-
ssion of the Supreme Court of Indiana at least annually a
report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, show-
ing its terms, its schedule of benefits, its subscription
charges, agreements with counsel, and financial results of
its legal service activities, or, if it has failed to do so, the
lawyer does not know or have cause to know of such
failure.
(E) A lawyer shall not accept employment when he knows or it is obvious
that a person who seeks his services does so as a result of conduct
prohibited under this Disciplinary Rule.
DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of Legal Services.
(A) A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that
he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept
employment resulting from that advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative,
former client (if the advice is germane to the former
employment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to
be a client.
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his par-
ticipation in activities designed to educate laypersons to
recognize legal problems, to make intelligent selection of
counsel, or to utilize available legal services if such activities
are conducted or sponsored by a qualified legal assistance
organization.
(3) A lawyer who is recommended, furnished or paid by a quali-
fied legal assistance organization enumerated in DR 2-103
(D)(1) through (4) may represent a member or beneficiary
thereof, to the extent and under the conditions prescribed
therein.
(4) Without affecting his right to accept employment, a lawyer
may speak publicly or write for publication on legal topics so
long as he does not emphasize his own professional experience
or reputation and does not undertake to give individual advice.
(5) If success in asserting rights or defense of his client in litiga-
tion in the nature of a class action is dependent upon the
joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek,
employment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining
their joinder.
DR 2-105 Limitation of Practice.
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, or as
limiting his practice, except:
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(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent
and Trademark Office may use the designation "Patents,"
"Patent Attorney," "Patent Lawyer," or "Registered Patent
Attorney" or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead
and office sign. A lawyer engaged in the trademark practice
may use the designation "Trademarks," "Trademark At-
torney," or "Trademark Lawyer," or any combination of those
terms, on his letterhead and office sign.
(2) A lawyer engaged in the admirality practice may use the
designation "Admiralty," "Proctor in Admiralty," or "Admiral-
ty Lawyer," or any combination of those terms, on his let-
terhead and office sign.
The above amendments to Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibilty shall
become effective January 1, 1978.
The Clerk is ordered to include this change in the next printing of the rules of
this Court and to send at this time a copy of this Order to the Reporter of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for publication in the next volume of the In-
diana Reports, to each judge and each clerk of each circuit, superior, criminal,
juvenile, county and small claims court in the State of Indiana, to the Indiana State
Bar Association, to West Publishing Company for publicaiton in the Northeastern Ad-
vance Sheets and to the Bobbs-Merrill Company for publication in the Indiana Deci-
sions and Law Reporter Advance Sheets.
DATED this 14 day of December, 1977.
Richard M. Givan
Chief Justice of Indiana
Appendix C
Chairman of the Indiana State Bar Association Specialization Committee
Otto Schug
1220 Washington Street
Columbus, Ind. 47201
Panelists at the 1977 Fall meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association
Bruce N. Cracraft
Vice President and General Counsel
Indiana Bell Telephone Company
240 North Meridian Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
William P. Glynn III, Director
Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum
735 West New York Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202
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Richard A. Wells
Executive Director
Texas Board of Legal Specialization
State Bar of Texas
Colorado at 15th
Austin, Texas 78711
Barry R. Davidson
Steel, Hector & Davis
1400 Southeast First National Bank Building
Miami, Florida 33131
Saul A. Wolfe
Skoloff & Wolfe
17 Academy Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Rabb Emison
Emison, Emison & Doolittle
8th and Busseron Street
Vincennes, Indiana 47591
Indiana Judicial Council on Legal Education and Competence at the Bar
Honorable Richard M. Givan, Chairman
Chief Justice of Indiana
324 State House
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
Honorable Cale J. Holder
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Federal Building
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
Honorable Donald H. Hunter
Supreme Court of Indiana
304 State House
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
Honorable James E. Noland
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Federal Building
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
Honorable Allen Sharp,
United States District Court
Northern District of Indiana
Federal Building
South Bend, Indiana 46601
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Bruce N. Cracraft
Vice President and General Counsel
Indiana Bell Telephone Company
240 North Meridian Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
Carl M. Gray
Attorney at Law
802 Main Street
Petersburg, Indiana 47567
Arthur L. Hart
Attorney at Law
Security Bank Building
Vincennes, Indiana 47591
Honorable Robert H. Staton
Presiding Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana
409 State House
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
